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Regulation and its reform are now prominent themes in American
politics. Despite their often technical character, regulatory reform pro-
grams successfully deploy a stirring set of political symbols and shibbo-
leths. "Get the government off our backs," "eliminate waste," and
"restore free enterprise" are appeals as visceral and irresistible as any in
our political lexicon. Regulatory reform has become a hardy American
perennial, the public policy equivalent of motherhood and apple pie.
The regulatory reform movement, however, has not enjoyed the same
degree of success in developing countries as it has in the United States.
The political traditions, legal institutions, cultural values, and economic
forces that shape regulatory policy in developing countries differ vastly
from their American counterparts. Daily life in many Third World1 states
is more communitarian and less individualistic than life in the United
States, and pervasive regulation is often a key instrument of national pol-
icy, strengthening the dominance of large state-run and private corpora-
tions. Regulation is endorsed by the Left on ideological grounds, by gov-
ernment bureaucracies in order to retain their power and patronage, and
by many on the Right as a way to maintain a secure, stable economic
environment. Government regulation of economic activity has thus enjoyed
an entrenched status in the Third World that is almost inconceivable in
the United States, given our volatile, competitive political system and mar-
ket-oriented economic principles.'
Today, however, the privileged position of governmental regulation is
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1. We use the term "Third World" throughout this Article only to draw an inevitably crude
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weakening in some developing countries, and the pas de deux so often
performed by American regulatory enthusiasts and critics is beginning to
be performed on other national stages as well. Brazil, Chile, and Mexico
are beginning to accept the World Bank's view that inefficient state-run
enterprises drain scarce public resources and must be returned to the
private sector.' Similarly, Third World countries such as India increas-
ingly believe that foreign capital should be welcomed rather than despised
and that it will go elsewhere unless regulatory controls on foreign invest-
ment are relaxed.4 Even in Africa, where various forms of socialism have
replaced colonial economies, some governments have reduced their reliance
on price controls and subsidies. This rejection of state-directed economic
activity reflects a growing disenchantment with the recent poor perform-
ance of planned economies compared to those economies with more domi-
nant capitalist sectors.' This incipient trend should be reinforced by the
World Bank's pressures on debtor countries to adopt market-oriented
reforms when they apply for "structural adjustment loans" (SALs).'
Hence, the time may be ripe for regulatory reform in certain areas of the
Third World.
Some Third World proponents of regulatory reform, seeking to over-
come their lack of experience and technical know-how, have looked to the
United States, where the development of regulatory refinements has
become something of a cottage industry in the last decade. That is pre-
cisely what happened recently in Peru. Certain public and private
3. Burns, The Condition of the World Economy, AEI ECONOMIST, June, 1986, at 5. In the early
1980's, deficits run by state-owned enterprises exceeded three percent of gross domestic product in
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. T. ENDERS & R. MATTIONE, LATIN AMERICA:
THE CRISIS OF DERT AND GROWTH 65 (1984).
4. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985 128 (1985) [Hereinafter WORLD
BANK].
5. Burns, supra note 3, at 6.
6. See A New Age of Capitalism, TIME, July 28, 1986, at 28-39. Indeed, Soviet scholars them-
selves have recognized the disparity in economic performance between market and state-controlled
economies in less developed societies. See HOUGH, THE STRUCGLE FOR THE THIRD WORLD: SOVIET
DEBATES AND AMERICAN OPTIONS 84-85 (1986).
7. For an evaluation of the Bank's structural adjustment lending program through 1984, see F.
YAGCI, S. KOMIN & V. ROSENBLAUM, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT LENDING: AN EVALUATION OF
PROGRAM DESIGN (World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 735, 1985). Although the Bank started the
SAL program in 1980, SALs should become more important in the wake of the so-called "Baker
Plan" initiative, advanced by the Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, in the fall of 1985. The
plan calls for commercial banks and the World Bank to advance up to $25 billion in additional loans
through 1990 to countries that commit themselves to "structural adjustment," that is, to undertake
reforms including liberalization of import barriers, devaluation of artificially inflated exchange rates,
"privatization" of state-owned enterprises, and removal of subsidies. The World Bank's own struc-
tural adjustment lending program, even without the substantial committment by commercial banks
that the Baker Plan envisions, is likely to encourage market-oriented policies in heavily indebted
countries with no other sources of funds to service mounting debt obligations. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1985, at Al, col. 1, Pine, U.S. Proposal On World Debt Faces Hurdles, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1985, at
35, col. 1.
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organizations saw a need to reform their country's economy and enlisted a
number of American academics and analysts-including the authors of
this Article-to help them transplant ideas and institutions that had ger-
minated and flourished in the United States into the seemingly inhospita-
ble soil of the Peruvian political and legal culture.
This Article describes that exciting but profoundly chastening attempt
to launch a kind of "non-technology transfer" program in the area of reg-
ulatory policy and distills the project's significance for similar reform
projects in other countries. Although the Article inevitably reflects our
own involvement in and sympathies toward the project, we have tried to
achieve sufficient detachment to allow us to draw some lessons from our
experience.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I describes Peru's recent eco-
nomic and political history and condition. Part II summarizes the struc-
ture and analytic foundations of the regulatory reform project. The pro-
ject's avowed objective was to dismantle Peru's "mercantilist" system, in
which large, rent-seeking corporations had successfully enlisted the gov-
ernment's regulatory authority to suppress competition. Part III further
describes Peru's existing economy and discusses three central elements of
the reform strategy: (1) a new system of property rights designed to
reduce corruption, encourage entrepreneurial activity, and make markets
more efficient; (2) a new body of administrative law designed to end
bureaucratic abuse of regulatory power and encourage public participa-
tion in regulatory policy making; and (3) a new process of technocratic
and political regulatory analysis designed to expose and limit rent-seeking
regulation that chiefly benefits politically influential economic interests
and imposes large costs on society. Part IV describes how these initiatives
were instituted, implemented, and eventually frustrated by a lack of gov-
ernmental enforcement and support from an apathetic private sector. It
then speculates about the prospects of such reforms. The Article concludes
with some general observations about the techniques and prospects for
regulatory change in societies very different from our own. We emphasize
that, while regulatory reform is not a panacea for the staggering economic
problems faced by Peru and other developing countries, it constitutes an
important strategy for progress.
I. Peru's Recent Economic and Political History
Peru is a desperately troubled nation. In 1985, Peru's gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita stood at approximately $650, down roughly
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forty percent from its 1981 peak. 8 Half of the nation's almost nineteen
million residents were unemployed or underemployed,9 a condition that
aggravated the gross inequalities in income and wealth distribution. The
$14 billion owed by Peru to foreign creditors was equal to roughly
seventy-five percent of the country's annual GDP." At the same time, the
prices of Peru's official export goods-primarily copper, oil, silver, and
zinc-were severely depressed, on average thirty-five percent below 1980
levels.11
The recent deterioration in the Peruvian economy dashed hopes that
had risen during preceding decades. Real manufacturing output, for ex-
ample, had increased at roughly a nine percent annual rate between the
late 1950's and middle 1970's, a pace that outstripped the overall eco-
nomic growth rate for the same period." In the late 1970's, rising prices
of Peru's primary mineral exports actually produced a surplus in the bal-
ance of trade, following serious deficits in prior years.1
Peru's macroeconomic difficulties of the 1980's have been accompanied
by microeconomic problems. State ownership of much of the banking sec-
tor, coupled with interest rate controls, has produced credit rationing that
favors large, highly visible, and capital-intensive projects, to the detriment
of smaller entrepreneurs who must rely on more informal funding sources.
Peru's large mining sector, which is highly dependent upon price levels set
in the world market, is severely depressed. Its fishing industry was devas-
tated in 1983 by climatic changes in ocean currents and has still not recov-
ered. In addition, its agricultural sector was debilitated in 1983, by both
severe flooding and drought.
The economic problems in Peru have added significance in light of the
fragility of its democratic institutions. Prior to 1980, the country was
ruled by military dictators for twelve years: first by General Juan Velasco
8. Ryser & Wippman, Alan Garcia is More than the Bad Boy of Latin Politics, BUSINESS
WEEK, Sept. 30, 1985, at 62, 64.
9. Roett, Peru: The Message from Garcia, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1985/86, at 274, 279.
While it is true that nearly half the workers are classifed as underemployed, this reflects official
statistics which do not consider informal workers as employed.
10. Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1985, at H6, co. 3; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 178.
11. INTE"RNATIONAL. MONErARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, June, 1986,
at 392-93. Even as the country's official export economy flounders, however, its unofficial cocaine
economy may be booming. According to some, coca paste is Peru's largest export, bringing in report-
edly $800 million a year. Malcomson, The Cocaine Economy: Scott Malcomson Reports From the
Jungles of Peru, THE VI.t.AGE VOICE, August 26, 1986, at 15. Government efforts to eradicate the
coca trade, while stepped up by President Garcia, have met serious opposition in the form of general
strikes and localized violence. Meanwhile, Peruvian coca farmers use government loan money to im-
prove agricultural production. Id. at 16.
12. PERU: A COUNTRY STUDY 149 (R. Nyrop ed. 1981).
13. INTERNATIONAL. MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, issues from
1980-1985.
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Alvarado (1968-75) and then by General Francisco Morales Bermudez
(1975-80)." These military regimes interrupted the civilian government
of President Fernando Belaunde Terry, who had been elected President in
1963. In 1980, elections returned Belaunde to power, but his rule was
highly ineffective. Not only did the economy collapse during his tenure,
but his administration also failed to stem the rise of Peru's violent Maoist
guerilla group, Sendero Luminoso, or "Shining Path." Insofar as any
coherent political program can be deduced from its terrorist behavior,
Sendero Luminoso's political agenda is to transform Peruvian society by
returning the country to its agrarian roots. During Belaunde's five years
in office, Sendero Luminoso spread its terrorist activities from the rural
mountainous area of Ayacucho Province to Lima itself, where the group
continues to bomb and attack the city's infrastructure. "
In 1985, Alan Garcia, a young politician who had enjoyed a rapid rise
to power in the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance Party (APRA),
was overwhelmingly elected President. His election reflected widespread
disaffection with the previous government and national impatience with
steadily deteriorating economic conditions. Although his campaign prom-
ised few specific courses of action, Garcia initiated sweeping reforms
immediately upon assuming power in July, 1985.
The new President introduced an austerity program that included con-
trols on foreign exchange to arrest the flight of capital from the country,
increases in gasoline prices, and devaluations of the Peruvian currency. At
the same time, Garcia implemented measures designed to help consumers
and wage-earners. These included price controls on basic goods, cuts in
interest rates, and increases in the minimum wage and government
worker salaries." Garcia's nationally most popular and internationally
most controversial step, however, was to announce that Peru would hence-
forth limit its annual debt service payments to ten percent of annual
exports. In October, 1985, Garcia announced a second set of measures
which included further cuts in interest rates and selective relaxations of
price controls. He also moved aggressively to subdue Sendero Luminoso
and to curtail Peru's drug traffic, estimated to account for $500-$800 mil-
lion in export earnings annually.
1 7
14. PE.Ru: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 12, at 39-58. See also Roett, supra note 9, at 275-77.
15. See Roett, supra note 9, at 276-77. During one week in February, 1986, Sendero Luminoso
guerillas bombed six embassies and 13 other targets in Lima. N.Y.Times, Feb. 23, 1986, at AS, col. 2.
From February, 1986, to May, 1986, the military detained 38,111 people and killed four while
"fighting [an] upsurge in urban guerilla violence." N.Y.Times, May 9, 1986, at A9, col. 2.
16. Roett, supra note 9, at 279-281; N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1985, at D4, col. 1.
17. Roett, supra note 9, at 279-281; N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1985, at 1, col. 5. See also Malcomson,
supra note 11. The two problems are related. Sendero Lurainoso has proven popular in areas of the
country where the government has mounted anti-drug campaigns.
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Garcia's bold actions by no means eliminated the immense problems
that his administration inherited. The inflation rate has receded from
triple-digit levels, but remains high. Peru's desire to attract new foreign
funds was frustrated in October, 1985, when United States bank regula-
tors declared Peru's debt to America's commercial banks to be "value-
impaired," a move that requires these banks to set aside steadily larger
reserves against their Peruvian loans, which in effect requires that they
write off increasing fractions of those assets." Most recently, Peru's deci-
sion in August, 1986, to refuse to adhere to the repayment schedule re-
quested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prompted a halt in
IMF lending to the country, which has in turn jeopardized additional
World Bank financing. 9 Garcia's decision in June, 1986, to strike back
militarily against a prison uprising organized by Sendero Luminoso
resulted in over 300 deaths, contributed to political tensions inside Peru,
and renewed charges that the government is violating human rights."°
The Garcia administration still faces a daunting set of tasks. The most
important will be to devise and implement a macroeconomic policy
capable of lifting the national economic growth rate without relying on
additional outside financing, which probably has been foreclosed by Gar-
cia's action to limit debt service repayments. Although this goal will at
best be extremely difficult to achieve, it may be impossible unless Peru-
vian policymakers also manage to curb excessive regulation and create a
more efficient property rights regime. Burdensome regulation has forced
resources to be used in costly compliance measures or, as is often the case,
for the payment of bribes rather than for productive investment. A poorly
developed system of property rights has retarded investment and innova-
tion. The absence of any meaningful system of administrative law has
made reform almost impossible. How these relationships have been dis-
covered and documented is the subject of the next Part.
18. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1985, at D14, col. 5. In 1979, Congress established an interagency
committee of bank regulators to assess the quality of bank loans to debtor countries. This Interagency
Country Evaluation Review Committee is composed of representatives from the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
When a country has not paid interest on its loans for six months and is not working with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to restore its debt service, the Committee must classify loans to that country as
"value-impaired." Under the International Lending Supervision Act, this designation requires banks
to set up a risk reserve on such loans. Typically, the initial reserve is 10% of the loan value; the
reserve must grow steadily as long as the designation applies. The reserve procedure is effectively
equivalent to a write-down of the loan amount, with the write-downs charged against current income
of banks that have such loans in their portfolios. For a description of this process, see Stokes, Mystery
Surrounds Agenda, Decisions of Foreign Loan Review Committee, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Sept. 21,
1985, at 2136-41.
19. N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1986, at A38, col. 4.
20. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at A2, col. 3. Other reports put the number of deaths as high as
400. Wall St. J., June 20, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
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II. The Project's Beginnings
This Part offers a history of the reform project developed by the Peru-
vian reform advocates and their American advisors, a description of the
economy that is the project's main concern, and an explanation of the
problems that regulation causes in Peruvian society.
A. Discovering Informality: The Institute For Liberty and Democracy
The Peruvian protagonist of our story is Hernando De Soto. Now in
his early forties, De Soto is a member of a prominent family of diplomats;
his father was an ambassador and his brother is currently the top aide to
Javier Perez de Cuellar, the Peruvian Secretary General of the United
Nations. After being educated both in Peru and in Europe, De Soto
remained abroad and eventually became the general manager of a major
international engineering firm based in Switzerland. In the late 1970's,
De Soto returned to Lima and entered private business. Politically well-
connected and unusually cosmopolitan for a Peruvian his age, he was
appointed by the new President of Peru, Fernando Belaunde Terry, to the
governing board of Peru's central bank.
When he returned to Peru, De Soto, who had spent most of the previ-
ous fifteen years in Europe and the United States, was struck by some of
the changes that had overtaken Lima. During his absence, the capital city
had roughly doubled in size-from a population of 2.3 million in 1965 to
4.5 million in 1980-largely due to an avalanche of immigration that
brought masses of Indians from ancient villages in the Andes to the dusty
plain in which Lima is situated. Once there, the new arrivals immediately
"invaded" the barren, unoccupied government-owned land at the ever-
extending outskirts of the city and built rude dwellings that were often no
more than cardboard shacks. These invasions were widely discussed
throughout Peru, but De Soto noticed something about the squatters'
areas that most other observers had missed. Often, within a relatively
short period of time, some of these illegal, jerry-built settlements, known
as pueblos jovenes, flourished. Amid the destitution and apparent disor-
der, enclaves would emerge in which one could observe permanent hous-
ing, urban infrastructures, and neighborhood amenities.
De Soto also noticed-one could hardly miss it-that the streets of
Lima were lined with a myriad of street vendors, known as ambulantes
because of the mobility of their bicycle-pulled or hand-pulled merchandise
carts. These vendors sold food, clothing, and a bewildering variety of other
goods. None had the municipally required license to do business, yet they
reappeared daily at the same outdoor locations, seldom engaged in "turf"
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disputes with their fellow vendors, and were rarely disturbed by the Lima
police.
Fascinated by these economic arrangements, De Soto resolved to learn
more about them. This was not an easy task; they were so much taken for
granted that Peruvians seldom discussed them. De Soto even coined a
term for these illegal but open activities: "informality" or "the informal
sector." This term was meant to contrast with activities conducted under
the authority of Peru's "formal" legal system, which defines and protects
recognized property rights, governs "legitimate" commercial conduct, and
adjudicates certain disputes. With the encouragement of some prominent
Peruvians-including Richard Webb, director of Peru's central bank, and
Mario Vargas Llosa, the nation's most celebrated author and a political
figure in his own right-De Soto established a research and advocacy
organization, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD or "the
Institute").
To help raise funds for the Institute, De Soto organized international
conferences on the Peruvian economy and the phenomenon of the informal
sector. To these conferences, financed by various American foundations
and the United States' Agency for International Development, he invited
leading figures from the worlds of economic theory, economic develop-
ment, international organization, and Peruvian politics. 1 Drawing upon
funds generated by the conferences, De Soto hired a small staff of young,
energetic lawyers and economists for the Institute, many of whom already
had considerable experience in various ministries of the national govern-
ment. This group-which resembled a market-oriented, Peruvian version
of "Nader's Raiders"-set to work assembling a mass of information
about the nature and extent of informal economic activity in Lima. By
generating a torrent of reports, newspaper and magazine articles, TV
appearances, and other public exposure, the Institute tried to impress
upon Peru and other South American countries the importance of the in-
formal sector to the nation's economic life.
B. Peru's Informal Economy
The Institute's findings2 were astonishing, even to De Soto. In areas as
diverse as housing, retailing, personal and commercial credit, urban
21. Among those attending the conference were economists Friedrich von Hayek and Milton
Friedman; U.N. Secretary General de Cuellar; Jan Tumlir, former chief economist of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); aides to Peruvian President Belaunde; and representatives
of the Peruvian Communist Party.
22. Most of the statistical information presented in this Part was gathered by the Institute in the
course of its research and is recorded, in Spanish, in memoranda and unpublished manuscripts on file
with the Yale Journal on Regulation. Some of the figures, especially population and economic
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transportation, and manufacturing, the Institute discovered a complex web
of informal economic activities that competed with, and in some cases
dwarfed, the formal sector. According to the Institute, this "other" econ-
omy, which is not "underground" but in fact operates quite openly, actu-
ally constitutes the heart of Peru's real economic life.
The Institute found, for example, that the population invasions that
create the pueblos jovenes are typically undertaken by well-organized
groups of as many as 20,000. Such large groups, consisting as they do of
potential voters and, if evicted, of potential rioters, cannot be ousted by the
formal authorities or by competing groups of residents. Their invasions
are coordinated by professional promoters who specialize in securing mu-
nicipal services and negotiating with political leaders and the police.
Within hours of the beginning of an invasion, the new residents draw
boundary lines to mark off their individual plots. These boundaries are
enforced by the group when disputes arise. Over time, as the residents
accumulate savings from their meager incomes and their expectations of
remaining in their new place ripen, the initially bare wooden structures
are improved with bricks, gardens, sidings, second stories, and roofs.2"
According to the Institute, the forty-seven percent of Lima's citizens who
currently live in pueblos jovenes have already invested an estimated $8
billion in residences that were originally-and remain-illegal.
Informality is, if anything, even more widespread in the urban trans-
portation sector, particularly in Lima's municipal bus system. ILD's
research has determined that almost nine of every ten passengers ride
buses that are operated either by "semi-formal" drivers-those with bus
routes granted under a municipal franchise and who charge regulated
fares, but who generally do not report their incomes to the tax authori-
ties-or by purely informal drivers, who lack a franchise and charge what
the traffic will bear. These informal drivers apparently provide a far more
highly-valued service than the formal transportation system, evidenced by
riders' willingness to pay higher fares for it. Moreover, they have devel-
oped a market in which bus routes are effectively traded and enforced
without resort to formal law.
Informality also dominates the activities of small commercial entrepre-
neurs, particularly an estimated 84,000 ambulantes who offer a full menu
of perishable and durable goods for sale in competition with larger, legal,
statistics, have been presented in the Institute's continuing series of articles in the weekly magazine
Caretas from June, 1985 to the present. The authors' personal summaries gathered from interview
notes are also on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation. For an analysis of the theoretical aspects
of Peru's informal economy, see P. Reuter & S. Salop, The Economic Consequences of Informality: A
Preliminary Theoretical Analysis, (July, 1984) (unpublished manuscript).
23. It last rained in Lima sometime in the early 1970's.
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establishments. Despite their informal status, the ambulantes are highly
organized. Street vendor organizations assign and enforce "property
rights" to slices of sidewalks that have estimated property values averag-
ing $500-$750 per slice. The organizations also collect dues that have ena-
bled the informal ambulantes of Lima to finance the construction of over
240 local markets there. In contrast, the municipal government of Lima
has constructed only four local markets for licensed vendors.
Because it is least visible, the extent of informality in the industrial
sector in Peru is not yet well-documented by the ILD. However, there is
no question that informal industries exist. The Institute has learned that
numerous small manufacturing enterprises-textile facilities, repair shops,
and the like-are operated informally in Peru's urban areas. To avoid
detection, they are kept small, generally operating in hidden locations
with fewer than a dozen employees.
In the aggregate, according to Institute estimates, over half of Peru's
population conducts most of its personal and commercial affairs in the
informal sector. 4 Clearly, two economies operate simultaneously in the
country-one officially sanctioned and protected by the formal legal sys-
tem, and another effectively beyond the reach of government and the law.
De Soto recognized that this state of affairs.was damaging Peru's na-
tional and local economies. Although he supposed that the country's legal
structure was responsible for the problem, he initially had no clear idea of
precisely how the law had contributed to its growth and thus was unable
to devise a solution. De Soto was a keen, sophisticated observer, but one
without a theory that could integrate this mass of new information into an
intelligible reality, much less a remediable one.
De Soto began to read in the law and economics literature and soon
found his theory. He immersed himself in academic discussions of the eco-
nomic effects of different legal rules, the ways in which a redefinition of
property rights could enhance economic efficiency and protect individual
liberty, and the value of cost-benefit analysis. Stimulated by his reading,
he came to the United States in 1983 in search of scholars and practition-
ers who could inform him and the Institute's staff, and who could assist
them in applying the insights of law and economics analysis to Peruvian
society. The trip was successful; in late 1983, a steady stream of American
lawyer-economists from universities and research institutes throughout the
United States began travelling to Lima to advise the Institute."
24. Litan, Morales-Bayo & Fernandez-Baca, International Reforms in Peru: A Promising Road
Out of the Debt Crisis, J. ECoN. GROWTH, 2d Quarter 1986, at 28, 29 [Hereinafter ECONOMIC
GROWTH).
25. De Soto's first American contact was Judge Robert Bork, who referred him to Professor War-
ren Schwartz of the Georgetown University Law School. The two authors of this article became
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With the Americans' help, the Institute began to integrate into a pat-
terned mosaic its painstakingly-gathered fragments of data about diverse
informal activities. It began to see the explosive growth of the pueblos
jovenes, for example, as a response to the severe housing shortage pro-
duced by governmental controls, and to the byzantine regulatory system
for securing legal title to unoccupied land in Lima. The Institute found
that new arrivals who want to acquire land must successfully negotiate a
bureaucratic maze consisting of more than 200 stages and consuming a
minimum of seven years.26 This process is complicated by the reluctance
of Peru's central government to cede the barren land that it owns to the
provincial or municipal governments, which have authority to grant title
to individual applicants.
The Institute also found that bureaucratic lethargy and red tape caused
much of the informality in the commercial sector. When the ILD
attempted to test the responsiveness of the regulatory system by forming a
small manufacturing business, 301 days were required simply to obtain
all the necessary government approvals and licenses for beginning opera-
tion.2 7 Rigid labor laws provide additional incentives for businesses to
operate outside the law. As in many other countries, formal establish-
ments in Peru find it virtually impossible to fire incompetent or malinger-
ing employees, and Peruvian corporations have long been required to
share a proportion of their profits with their workers.
The explosion of informality in Lima's urban bus system was likewise
found to be caused by regulatory overkill. By keeping regulated bus fares
extremely low-less than ten cents per ride despite fuel costs equivalent
to, or even higher than, those in the U.S.-the city has encouraged drivers
of semiformal busses, who carry roughly half of all daily traffic in Lima,
to deviate from their franchised routes and pick up passengers anywhere.
As a result, these busses are crowded and their routes are labyrinthine.
Many purely informal busses, which carry roughly half of the municipal
traffic, offer more direct service under more comfortable conditions but at
higher, unregulated prices.
involved in the Institute's work through Professor Schwartz. Many others have also since participated,
including: Stuart Butler of the Heritage Foundation; Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution;
Charles Goetz of the University of Virginia Law School; Thomas Hopkins of the University of Mary-
land; Peter Huber, a Washington-based attorney and scientist; Paul Kahn of the Yale Law School;
Ron Kirby of the Urban Institute; Saul Levmore of the University of Virginia Law School; Jerry
Mashaw of the Yale Law School; Richard Taranto, a Washington attorney; Gordon Tullock of
George Mason University; and Lawrence White, formerly of New York University and now a mem-
ber of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
26. E:ONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 24.
27. One of the researchers tried the same experiment in Tampa, Florida and finished in three and
a half hours. Martin, In Lima, Even Buses and Clothes are Part of Informal Economy, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
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Finally, the ILD found that regulation contributes to the existence of
informal credit arrangements. Tight interest rate controls have enabled
eligible borrowers to obtain financing at negative real rates of interest, but
at the same time have forced formal credit institutions such as banks and
savings associations to ration credit. Not surprisingly, this rationing sys-
tem has rewarded firms and individuals that borrow in the formal sector.
Informal entities generally lack the income or respectability necessary
even to get a foot in the door at a bank. Equally important, due to the
illegal status of their operations and of the loans that they manage to
obtain, informal borrowers typically lack enforceable property rights in
merchandise and housing that could otherwise serve as collateral.
C. Regulation and Informality
The thriving informal sector and the conditions that encouraged and
sustained it imposed severe costs on Peruvian society. The most obvious
costs imposed were economic. Bribes to public officials and other attempts
to avoid detection by those who could shut down informal firms had
become an important cost of doing business informally, one that drained
valuable resources away from socially productive activities and redis-
tributed money from typically poor individuals to police and other rela-
tively more affluent officials. Operating illegally and in remote areas of
the city, informal firms could not achieve their growth potential by fully
exploiting economies of scale, advanced technologies, advertising, and
access to markets. Their incentives to save and invest were also weakened
(although not eliminated) because their property and contracts received no
legal protection. For example, one Institute survey of investment in hous-
ing developments found that residents who had formal legal title to their
homes invested significantly more in housing-even after the data were
adjusted for income and age of housing-than did residents in the pueblos
jovenes, in which property rights are protected only informally.
Such economic costs extended well beyond the informal sector to formal
firms and to the government itself. The existence of informal firms meant
in many cases that different firms competing for the same customers were
not playing by the same rules. By complying with the law, formal firms
were obliged to incur certain costs that their informal competitors simply
avoided. This problem might have been less troublesome if the laws or
regulations in question were unsound, but competitive distortions were not
confined to those circumstances. The formal sector was disadvantaged by
its compliance with wise and unwise regulations alike. Finally, many in
the informal sector were assumed not to pay taxes, thereby depriving the
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government of much revenue, while bribes in lieu of taxes were privately
appropriated by public officials.
The political costs of widespread informal activity were probably even
greater than the economic ones. Flagrant disregard for the law could only
erode popular confidence in government and the legal system. The wink
and the nod were hardly fit symbols for an aspiring democratic regime.
Especially where self-government and democracy are in their infancy and
terrorism is an almost daily occurrence, respect for legal institutions is a
precious, expendable resource that must not be squandered. Informality
on the scale found in Peru, and the bribery and cynicism so essential to its
maintenance, can create an environment in which all laws come to be
seen as impertinent impediments to individual economic advancement.
III. The Reform Strategy
This Part examines Peru's formal, "mercantilist," economic sector and
presents the three central elements of the Institute's reform strategy: a
new system of property rights, a new body of administrative law, and a
new process of regulatory analysis.
A. Peru's "Mercantilist" Economy
The Institute had documented the existence and spread of a massive
informal sector that not only burdened the already weak economic struc-
ture of Peru but also threatened to rend the nation's fragile social, legal,
and political fabric. The Institute's research had identified the regulatory
system as a major cause of that problem. To develop this diagnosis, De
Soto synthesized the conventional law and economics analysis of regula-
tion with his own context-specific perceptions about the distinctive histori-
cal and cultural setting of Peru's political economy. The social conscious-
ness and public philosophy governing Peru, he believed, were
fundamentally hostile to the cultural, economic, and political values neces-
sary to support a free market.
This Peruvian attitude should be distinguished from the kind of anti-
market consciousness predicted by Marx or by Schumpeter 28 since it did
not arise out of Peru's reaction to the dynamics or culture of capitalism.
De Soto believed that Peruvians had embraced a socialistic ethos without
ever having experienced the stage of capitalism. This resembled the same
kind of inversion of Marx that Lenin contrived in the Russian Revolution.
In doing so, De Soto observed, Peru had adopted a "mercantilist" political
economy.
28. J. SCHUMPI'I'ER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1947).
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De Soto's description of Peruvian mercantilism confirmed the precon-
ceptions of many of his American advisers. At a rhetorical level, it bore
strong similarities to what Ralph Nader has called "corporate socialism,"
or "socialism for the rich, capitalism for the poor." At a more abstract
level, this mercantilism bore strong similarities to the Chicago School-style
public choice and law and economics analyses, which predict the "regula-
tory capture" of vote-seeking politicians by rent-seeking corporate inter-
ests (and vice-versa). In a society that had never developed strong private
institutional defenders of competitive markets, mercantilism could only
preserve the dismal economic and political status quo, choking off pros-
pects for significant change. De Soto concluded that genuine reforms could
not be realized simply by attacking particular anti-competitive regulations.
The underlying institutional and ideological foundations that supported
mercantilist regulation had to be challenged so that competitive enter-
prise-that of the ambulantes, the pueblos jovenes, the would-be manu-
facturers, and the illegal bus drivers-could flourish under the protection,
rather than the threat, of the formal law.
De Soto's task was formidable. He knew, however, that he was not
wholly without resources. In a society in which the number of influential
people is relatively small, De Soto enjoyed wealth and excellent access to
the top levels of the Belaunde government, including the President him-
self. Like Nader, he possessed impressive political entrepreneurial skills.
He could effectively manipulate elite opinion, raise money, and inspire
media attention both in Peru and abroad. Employing a dramatic rhetoric,
De Soto could mobilize widespread discontent with the manifest failures
of the existing parties, ideologies, and programs, and could exploit the
growing demands for thorough-going economic reform in Peru. He could
appeal to national idealism and attract some of the most talented young
professionals in Peru. He could draw upon a unique research organiza-
tion to substantiate his empirical data. Finally, he believed fervently in a
powerful theory, one that could help Peruvians make sense of what they
saw and felt.
B. The Institute's Reform Initiatives
1. Property Rights
De Soto proceeded along separate but related avenues to reform. First,
he sought to jettison the traditional system of mercantilist regulation that
had engendered informality. Mercantilism would be replaced by a new
system in which property rights would be redefined to encourage and pro-
tect enterprise rather than stifle it and force it underground. Since
informality itself was not the problem, De Soto rejected a "law and order"
Vol. 4: 51, 1986
Peru
approach emphasizing more effective enforcement against the informal
sector. In Peru, bribery is a way of life. The income generated from it is
generally expected to supplement meager official salaries. A "law and or-
der" strategy would have increased both the demand for and the cost of
bribes, thereby aggravating the existing system's inefficiency and its
regressive distributional consequences.
De Soto had a more important reason for trying to legalize informal
activity rather than suppress it. Most activities in which the informal sec-
tor engaged were legitimate and socially productive. Only a perverse mer-
cantilism had rendered them illegal in the first place. Raising the cost of
such activities would obviously disadvantage all Peruvians who benefited
from them. Instead, De Soto advocated replacing "administrative
rights"-governmentally conditioned, highly restricted licenses to do busi-
ness-with property rights that would facilitate economically beneficial
transactions by expanding and protecting the field of permissible competi-
tion. In some cases, for example where price controls are imposed on
selected commodities, a reform strategy based upon property rights could
lead to complete deregulation. In areas such as food safety, where contin-
ued regulation is justifiable, the property rights strategy implies only a
relaxation of controls or a redesign of regulatory techniques.
De Soto expected intense resistance to deregulation. No real political
constituency for regulatory reform yet existed in Peru, and the Institute's
analysts were not yet in a position to make the case for deregulating any
one sector. De Soto therefore chose to defer temporarily proposals for sub-
stantive regulatory reform of particular markets. Instead, he sought to
establish procedural and methodological reforms that could be applied
across the board to all regulations. In the long run, he felt, such reforms
would help to curtail or eliminate existing undesirable regulations while
at the same time making it more difficult for mercantilist bureaucrats to
adopt new regulations. This strategy drew him toward several regulatory
reform techniques that had been employed in the United States, tech-
niques that centered on the related areas of administrative law and regu-
latory analysis.
2. Administrative Law
The system of administrative law so familiar to the Institute's American
analysts was quite alien to Peru. In particular, American administrative
law contains three structural features unknown to Peruvian law. First,
United States law requires that an elaborate and at least minimally
rational public process precede the issuance of final regulations. Second,
independent courts impose substantial supervisory control over regulatory
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decision-making, including some exercises of administrative discretion.
Third, individual citizens and private groups in the United States have a
legally recognized opportunity to play an active role at every stage of the
regulatory process, from the initiation of regulatory proposals, to the
examination of most documents and evidence on which regulations pur-
port to be based, to the invocation of several possible stages of judicial
review. In contrast, the process of rule-making in Peru was remarkably
straightforward: a ministry wishing to adopt a rule simply published it in
final form in El Peruano, the official government newspaper. Private in-
dividuals or groups had no legal right to participate in the rule-making
process in any way, and there were no sanctions, judicial or otherwise, for
routine bureaucratic illegality.
3. Regulatory Analysis
If Peruvian administrative law seemed rudimentary, Peruvian regula-
tory analysis was non-existent. The visiting Americans fully anticipated
this; indeed, formal regulatory analysis remained quite controversial in the
United States even a decade after it had first been required.2 ' However,
the Americans were puzzled to learn that even the Institute's staff, if not
De Soto himself, had serious misgivings about such a reform.
The Institute's economists patiently informed the Americans of some of
the hard realities of regulation in Peru. The government employed very
few economists or policy analysts, and none was highly trained by Ameri-
can standards in the art and science of regulatory impact analysis. Even
the Institute's economists, who De Soto insisted were among the most
sophisticated in the country, had almost no experience with such tech-
niques. Furthermore, the government collected little of the data that the
American analysts took for granted, data necessary in order to appraise
the effects of regulation. Whatever information there was remained under
the control of the ministries, which jealously guarded the public's access to
it. Even relatively simple regulatory analyses would take time and money
that private groups in Peru lacked and would probably be completed long
after the ministries had issued the regulations in question. Finally, there
would be little political support for regulatory analysis. Its pri-
mary beneficiaries-informal entrepreneurs burdened by mercantilist
29. Compare Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. RE'v. 1059 (1986) (Congress should prohibit Office of Management and
Budget oversight of substance of agency rules) with DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. Rr v. 1075 (1986) (OMB review is necessary tool to insure consis-
tency of agency rules with administration's broader objectives).
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regulations-were unorganized, unsophisticated, and reluctant to become
too visible lest they be harassed by the police.
De Soto reminded his staff that the Institute had few alternative options
and so urged them to be bold and self-confident. His exhortations took on
a special urgency in late November of 1984, when the Council of Minis-
ters of the Belaunde government issued a Supreme Decree under a spe-
cial, time-limited delegation of authority from the Peruvian Congress. De
Soto had helped draft the decree; moreover, he had appointed the Coun-
cil's director (who was the President's nephew) to the Institute's advisory
board.
The Supreme Decree"° provided that, with certain exceptions, all regu-
lations that "could affect . . . the incorporation of the informal sector into
the legal system or the maintenance of the formal sector therein" had to
be published in El Peruano before their effective date. It further required
that the publication include a brief explanation of why the proposed regu-
lation was "necessary for . . . the public interest" and state that any
interested individuals or groups from the public or private sectors could
"submit their opinions or suggestions" to the relevant ministry. In turn,
the ministry was obliged to "consider such suggestions and opinions so as
to evaluate the convenience of their incorporation into the final text."
The Supreme Decree also established a key role for the National Com-
mittee on Economic Rights (CODE). At De Soto's urging, CODE had
been established by an earlier decree to coordinate the government's new
initiative on behalf of the informal sector. De Soto had seen to it that
CODE would be directed and staffed by lawyers and economists from the
Institute. The Decree provided that CODE would specify the criteria,
procedures, and formalities applicable to the publication requirement,
along with the kinds of justifications required of the issuing ministry in its
publication notice. De Soto finally had his long-sought opportunity to
implement regulatory reform.
IV. Implementation of the Plan
A growing political incubus endangered the implementation of the
November decree. The first Presidential elections since 1980 were sched-
uled for April, 1985; Belaunde was retiring and a new President would
assume office in late July. De Soto, along with most political observers,
was confident that Belaund6's party, which was widely regarded as inef-
fective and enervated, would lose. Absent a military coup, which was
30. Supreme Decree No. 071-84-PCM (1984) (English version on file with the Yale journal on
Regulation).
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viewed as highly unlikely, Belaunde would have to surrender office to
Alan Garcia, the charismatic, thirty-five-year-old leader of the APRA op-
position. De Soto was acquainted with Garcia-like most members of the
Peruvian elite, they had attended the same schools-and hoped to develop
a working relationship with him. Still, Garcia was an unknown quantity,
and De Soto doubted that APRA, which had been kept out of power for
more than a half-century by force and fraud,"1 could be counted upon to
retain, much less implement, a politically controversial regulatory reform
program endorsed by a discredited outgoing administration. After fifty
years in the wilderness, the APRA socialists would probably try to sweep
out everything associated with the old government, which certainly would
include its pro-market, competition-enhancing reforms.
In anticipation of these developments, the November decree imposed a
tight deadline for reform. It provided that CODE prepare its specifica-
tions for regulatory justifications and public comments before February
19, 1985, only three months hence. On that date, if the specifications were
approved by the Council of Ministers, they would be issued in another
Supreme Decree. Just before Christmas, one of the authors of this Article,
Peter Schuck, flew to Lima to draft the contents of the hoped-for Supreme
Decree and the necessary supporting materials. He had tried to prepare
himself by reading available accounts in English of recent Peruvian politi-
cal and economic developments. Upon his arrival, he was briefed by the
administrative lawyers from CODE/ILD about the Peruvian regulatory
structure. After further discussions, he drafted a series of documents that
were intended to comprise a general legal framework for regulatory
reform.
This framework consisted of four major elements: (1) a procedure for
rulemaking and subsequent judical review, essentially drawn from Section
Four of the Administrative Procedure Act;"2 (2) a procedure for regula-
tory impact analysis modeled on President Reagan's 1981 Executive
Order 12291;, 8 (3) a manual, to be incorporated into the Supreme Decree,
that CODE would supply to the ministries to educate and guide them in
preparing the regulatory analyses required under the Decree; and (4) a
proposal to transform the office of the Public Minister. This office, an
adjunct of the Attorney General that was statutorily designated as "the
defender of the people," had long been moribund. The innovations were
31. See Roett, supra note 9, at 277-79.
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 702-06 (1985). These provisions authorize notice-and-comment rule making
and set standards for judicial review.
33. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982) (requiring that agencies perform cost-benefit
analysis before promulgating rules, and providing for OMB review of substance of rules), supple-
mented by Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985).
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intended to turn the office into a kind of governmental ombudsman, advo-
cate for the informal sector, expert commentator on regulatory proposals,
and mobilizer of public opinion on behalf of regulatory reform.34
Neither the American draftsman nor his eager clients expected that
American institutions and methods could readily be adapted to the Peru-
vian political economy. The differences between the two systems were
obvious and occasioned constant attention and discussion. When the docu-
ments containing the reform proposals were finally presented to De Soto
and the Institute staff, they were painstakingly reviewed in a dialectical
process that the participants came to call "Peruvianization." At the most
elementary level, this meant translating the documents into legal Spanish
without losing-or inadvertently acquiring-important nuances in the
process. Primarily, however, it meant finding techniques by which these
proposals, which De Soto described as "revolutionary" for Peru, could be
made to transcend the traditional boundaries of that nation's distinctive
legal, political, economic, and ideological cultures, while taking account of
the realistic limits on the possibility for rapid change.
"Peruvianization" took several specific forms. First, the procedural
requirements originally proppsed were greatly simplified. The initial pub-
lication proposal was quite detailed, even by American standards; it
involved an elaborate rulemaking and regulatory calendar procedure, a
mandatory review of existing regulations, and the enlargement of CODE's
enforcement and clearance powers to approximate those (mutatis mutan-
dis) of our Office of Management and Budget. This proposal was pro-
gressively stripped down. The rulemaking procedure became skeletal, the
requirements for a regulatory calendar and a review of existing regulation
were jettisoned altogether, and CODE's functions were reduced essen-
tially to exhortation and technical assistance.
Second, the proposal's analytical requirements were substantially
relaxed. During successive drafts, for example, the categories of regulatory
impact information that the ministries would publish were narrowed, the
obligation to quantify anticipated costs and benefits was diluted, and
fewer alternatives to regulation were required to be considered. Third, the
publication and analytical requirements were qualified by broad excep-
tions for "emergency" and "impracticability" situations. These exceptions,
34. This idea was a pastiche inspired by several American institutions: public advocate ofices at
the federal and state levels; governmental subsidies for "public interest group" participation in regula-
tory proceedings; the aborted proposal from the early 1970's for a federal consumer protection agency;
formal interventions in regulatory proceedings by pro-competition agencies such as the Justice De-
partment's Antitrust Division; and the auditing and investigatory functions of congressional commit-
tees and the General Accounting Office.
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it was recognized, might be used by the ministries to subvert those provi-
sions, but prudence and existing law left the drafters little choice.
Despite-or more realistically, because of-the compromises exacted by
the "Peruvianization" process, the documents that CODE finally submit-
ted to the Council of Ministers and that the Council issued as a decree on
February 19, 1985,"5 constituted a defensible, carefully-integrated package
of potentially significant reforms. The centerpiece of the package was a
requirement that each ministry wishing to propose a regulation publish
for public comment a regulatory analysis of the proposal. This analysis
was called an "ABIP," its acronym in Spanish. The ABIP requirement
attempted to distinguish between rules that would relax existing restric-
tions on market activity and those that would add new or more confining
ones, setting different analytic requirements for each. For "deregulating
rules," the ABIP merely had to provide "a simple explanation of the
objectives expected to be achieved and the means considered to be used."
For rules that would increase regulation, however, the ABIP had to
contain a demanding analysis and justification. First, it would have to
explain in detail the nature and importance of the problem necessitating
regulation, describe the objectives of the proposed rule in quantitative
terms, if possible, and predict what would happen if no new rule were
issued. Second, the ABIP would have to discuss the means by which the
rule would achieve its regulatory objective and present a detailed analysis
of each of the proposed rule's significant costs and benefits, comparing
them with the status quo and using quantitative estimates, if available.
This analysis would discuss "all significant factors," including the rule's
effect on the formal sector, on the informal sector, and on small-scale com-
panies and their access to the legal economy, its effect on low-income con-
sumers, the administrative burdens it would impose on firms and public
agencies, and its overall effect on economic efficiency. Third, the ABIP
had to include consideration of "one or more less restrictive alternatives"
to the proposed rule and, for each such alternative, conduct the same kind
of cost-benefit analysis as that done on the rule itself. Further, the Decree
required an explanation of the reasons for rejecting each alternative.
The February Decree included two documents in addition to the ABIP
requirement. CODE's guidelines for the preparation of ABIPs contained
a detailed explanation of the purposes and methodology of ABIPs, the
criteria for the required analysis, and a standardized ABIP form.
CODE's guidelines for the conduct of public hearings, which it recom-
mended and, in some circumstances, required, created another means by
which ministries could elicit public comments on proposed regulations. In
35. Spanish version on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation.
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addition, CODE, with the help of a co-author of this Article, Robert
Litan, prepared several "model" ABIPs on new regulatory proposals, cir-
culated these to the ministries as a way of demonstrating the feasibility
and value of the technique and provided other kinds of ABIP-related tech-
nical assistance to ministerial staffs.
The regulatory reform initiative embedded in the February decree was
an extremely far-reaching overhaul of the Peruvian system. In a state that
seemed to churn out new anti-competitive regulations without significant
constraint, these new legal structures were intended to democratize and
rationalize regulatory intervention. For the first time, mechanisms were
created to bring the interestsl of the informal sector, small-scale enterprise,
and low-income consumers systematically to the forefront of bureaucratic
consciousness. Indeed, the new ABIP process was in some ways even more
ambitious than the regulatory system in the United States. For example,
despite urgings by the authors of this Article that the analytic require-
ments be limited to major rules alone, as they are in the United States,36
the Institute's final version of the plan contemplated cost-benefit analysis
of virtually all rules affecting the private sector. The Institute's logic was
that publication, even if it accomplished nothing else, would at least loosen
the regulatory bottleneck. Moreover, the Public Minister, whom De Soto
knew to be sympathetic, would be well-positioned to act as a politically
and technically sophisticated in-house advocate for the informal sector. To
the authors' knowledge, no similar package of reforms had ever been insti-
tuted in a developing country.3 7 If it succeeded, it could send enormous
ripples throughout the Third World.
De Soto and his American advisors fully expected that such radical (if
sensible) institutional innovations would encounter stout bureaucratic
resistance from regulators, as has often occurred in the United States. In
anticipation of opposition, they prepared to enlist the support of various
private sector interests to bring pressure on the relevant ministries to
adhere to the ABIP requirements. The Institute intended to help the min-
istries prepare ABIPs and to assist private interests affected by regulatory
proposals in preparing their comments. All this activity, which would be
conducted behind the scenes, was designed to advance the regulatory
reforms that the Institute desired.
36. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 33.
37. It is true that a package of market-oriented reforms was introduced in Chile in the 1970's on
the advice of economists from the University of Chicago, most notably Milton Friedman. See P.
O'BRIEN & J. RODDICK, CHILE: THE PINOCHET DECADE (1983). Those reforms consisted primarily
of liberalizing trade barriers and restricting monetary growth to control inflation. In contrast, the
reforms championed by the ILD are microeconomic in nature, focusing on domestic deregulation and
securing individual rights of property, contract and business organization in an effort to facilitate
market transactions.
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Unfortunately, events did not transpire as De Soto and his colleagues at
the Institute had hoped. Neither the Peruvian government nor the bureau-
cracy was prepared to accept such a significant alteration of the legal
landscape without a struggle. With the Presidential elections only eight
weeks away, the political timing could not have been less propitious. A
few regulators, particularly in the economically important Fisheries Min-
istry from which several CODE lawyers had been recruited, initially com-
plied with the new Supreme Decree by publishing rules and preparing
ABIPs with the aid of CODE and the Institute. Most, however, simply
ignored the new rules, confident that the outgoing President's interests lay
elsewhere and that time was on their side.
The Supreme Decree also generated a desultory response from the for-
mal Peruvian business community. Various trade associations initially
expressed some interest in the reform package, giving De Soto and his
staff opportunities to present and discuss the implications of the ABIP and
public comment requirements. But, correctly sensing that they were them-
selves potential targets of the Institute's proposals, the associations did lit-
tle thereafter to support the new initiatives. De Soto anticipated this reac-
tion. After all, the revolution he hoped to instigate sought to destroy the
mercantilist tradition that he felt had brought Peru its current woes.
In the face of this widespread recalcitrance on the part of regulators
and the business community, the Institute altered its original strategy. In
doing so, it managed to turn what could have been a crushing defeat into
a significant advance by taking advantage of support from the press, the
one sector of Peruvian society that backed the reforms. Shortly after the
national elections, the municipality of Lima issued a new decree imposing
a tight system of regulation on the city street vendors. Though the
requirements of the February decree did not pertain to municipal regula-
tion, the Institute seized the opportunity created by the new street vendor
ordinance to demonstrate the powerful use to which cost-benefit tech-
niques could be put. The Institute prepared its own ABIP of the new rule
and published it as a full-page advertisement in all of the major newspa-
pers in the city. The advertisement pointed out how the costs of the street
vendor ordinance far outweighed its benefits, that it would only aggravate
the problem of bribery, and that it would result in increased consumer
prices for the vendors' products.
The advertisement generated an immediate and dramatic response.
Organizations of street vendors, existing and new, protested the new rule.
Several city newspapers criticized it in their editorials. Newspapers,
magazines, and television continued to report the controversy, putting
pressure on the municipality to reconsider its regulatory decision. This
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adverse publicity and public pressure in opposition to the ordinance would
never have arisen without the Institute's initiative.
The Institute continued to engage in similar activities. In May, 1985, a
major Peruvian weekly magazine, Caretas, agreed to publish articles pre-
pared by the Institute on the relationship between regulation and the in-
formal sector. The Institute has continued to write articles for Caretas,
educating the public about informality generally and about specific areas
of excessive or inappropriate regulation, -particularly in the housing and
transportation sectors.
Although the Institute's "private sector" strategy did not initially have
the success that it hoped for, the strategy slowly gathered momentum.
Immediately after CODE was created, the Institute brought the ill effects
of two regulatory proposals to the attention of two important constituen-
cies: restaurant owners and the fishing industry trade association. Neither
group was able to block or change the proposals; indeed, neither seemed
very interested. The Institute was somewhat more effective in late 1985
and early 1986 when it mobilized the municipal bus drivers' union in
Lima against a proposal by the municipal government to use bus drivers
as tax collectors in a new transportation tax system. Although the propo-
sal was eventually implemented, the Institute's work against the proposal
attracted considerable notice in the city and built support for its activities
among a large organized workforce.
Limited success for the Institute came in the spring of 1986 when it
persuaded the Garcia government to direct the Public Minister to exercise
his ombudsman-like responsibilities by receiving citizen complaints about
the government and bringing them to the attention of the proper minis-
tries. The Institute had previously urged this step on the Belaunde gov-
ernment but had failed; by 1986, however, the timing for such a reform
had improved. Garcia himsf had made some gestures toward the infor-
mal sector in his first six months in office, promising to rectify the une-
qual distribution of wealth that he claimed had victimized the informal
sector. An active Public Minister might be an attractive element in his
overall strategy.
De Soto quickly took advantage of the new ombudsman process to ad-
vance a major element of the Institute's reform agenda: housing reform for
residents of the pueblos jovenes. Immediately after the Public Minister
began his "defender of the people" role, the Institute helped to orchestrate
a flood of complaints from groups representing over 300,000 people who
could not readily secure title to their make-shift residences. The Institute
cited these complaints when it urged the government to streamline the
extremely cumbersome bureaucratic process for obtaining title. The Insti-
tute's campaign clearly struck a political nerve. The prospect of granting
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title to millions of Peruvians encouraged President Garcia quickly to seize
the issue and make it his own. In April, he made a well-publicized visit to
the pueblos jovenes and announced a titling law that was immediately
approved by the lower house of Peru's legislature.
Although De Soto and the Institute publicly congratulated Garcia for
responding to the Public Minister's campaign, they were not completely
satisfied. They felt that the measures failed to topple the bureaucratic ob-
stacles that the Institute had targeted. In addition, the new law would
grant imperfect titles that prohibited rentals and restricted the rights of
owners to resell their properties. Eventually, after hearing testimony from
De Soto, the Senate Committee charged with revising Garcia's proposal
incorporated several of the Institute's recommendations in its version of
the titling law and requested the Institute's assistance in drafting more
comprehensive housing legislation in the future.
The Institute is currently seeking to capitalize on the public attention
that its housing reform efforts attracted. Through expanded media expo-
sure, it hopes to persuade the government and the public of the regressive
effects of excessive regulation. Perhaps even more importantly in the long
run, De Soto hopes to convince the informals that they have a strong com-
mon interest in fighting excessive regulation through political action. Once
assembled and mobilized, De Soto believes, this constituency of informals,
with allies in the media and formal sector, may succeed in motivating
Peru's leaders to adopt the legal reforms necessary to integrate the coun-
try's two economies, thereby laying a solid foundation for future national
growth.
The Institute also hopes to inspire similar efforts in other Latin Ameri-
can countries that have significant informal sectors. In 1985 De Soto
spread his message to a conference on micro-enterprise in Latin America
held in Mexico City and thereafter met with individuals from Brazil, El
Salvador, and Venezuela who were interested in establishing research or-
ganizations in those countries modeled on the Institute.
Conclusion
It would be gratifying to conclude this account on a note of optimism.
We would like to report that significant progress has been made and gains
consolidated, that Peru is firmly on a path toward improved economic
efficiency, more equitable distribution of income, greater scope for small
enterprise, and rational, accountable regulation. Unfortunately, we can-
not. Five years after the Institute began its extraordinary crusade for fun-
damental changes in the economic, legal, and regulatory systems of Peru,
the nation's economic future remains bleak. Although it has awakened the
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Peruvian government to the plight of the informal sector, the Institute's
reform program has thus far failed to take firm institutional root in Peru's
inhospitable political culture.
Certainly the Institute's difficulties do not stem from want of effort,
skill, or imagination. Although reformist enterprises of this sort may seem
numbingly familiar to media-weary Americans, nothing quite like them
has ever occurred before in Peru or, apparently, anywhere in the Third
World. The Institute's energetic investigation and documentation of the
informal sector and of the conditions that have promoted and sustained it
is a model of policy-oriented, reformist reportage accomplished under the
most severe constraints. De Soto's ability to use those findings in a politi-
cally creative way has been impressive. He won a place on a national
policy agenda that had long been crowded and misshapen by constant eco-
nomic and political turmoil. In the name of property rights, he challenged
the dominant socialist ideology at a time when it was rising to the zenith
of its power in Peru. Moreover, he not only articulated a competing ideol-
ogy of property rights, but also managed to reify it (however briefly) in
legal decrees, in specific guidance to administrative bodies, and in the
design of governmental institutions. De Soto's program thus provides an
enduring ideal to which Peruvians may perhaps turn when they are
weary of the country's present, almost certainly futile course. Even so,
that moment of vindication seems distant today. For now, at least, De Soto
remains one voice crying out in the Peruvian wilderness. His program of
property rights, administrative law, regulatory reform, and advocacy for
the informal sector seems politically anachronistic in an era marked by
APRA's triumphant accession to power and its strategic need to discredit
what preceded it.
The first lesson to be learned from this experience, then, is that in the
politics of economic reform, timing is everything. Had the Institute started
its work several years earlier, it would have had more time to prepare the
soil in which the seeds were sown; had it been able to nurture its fragile
creations slowly and carefully until they were sturdy enough to defend
themselves, its efforts might have been more fruitful. Had the new regime
been more self-confident and less determined to uproot whatever its prede-
cessor had cultivated, the Institute might have had more breathing space
in which to demonstrate the value of its program and institutionalize its
reforms. Had Peru's political and economic condition been somewhat less
turbulent, more public attention might have been paid to the Institute's
proposals.
Crisis also creates political opportunity-our second lesson-and De
Soto was quick to exploit it. It was not inevitable then, nor is it inevitable
even today, that Peru's agony would lead it to reject property rights,
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regulatory reform, and the liberation of the informal sector as remedies
for its chronic economic problems. We do not claim that the Institute's
policy agenda necessarily contains the answer to Peru's current economic
difficulties, but we have little doubt that De Soto and his colleagues are on
to something important. A legal system that discourages the formation of
efficient business enterprises cannot help but inhibit economic growth.
Similarly, a legal system that fails to guarantee fundamental rights of
property, contract, and business organization must discourage entrepre-
neurs from innovating and investing to increase production and develop
new markets. Consumers and workers will inevitably suffer from these
disincentives.
Private markets, of course, are not perfect either and can generate sig-
nificant social costs. Once unleashed, powerful entrepreneurial forces can
introduce profound cultural and aesthetic changes as competitive, materi-
alistic values destabilize social arrangements built upon values that are
traditional, solidaristic, and often religious. Fearing such changes, Peru
could rationally choose to tolerate a smaller role for market institutions
and values than we in the United States might wish for ourselves or for
others. At a minimum, however, De Soto's efforts suggest that greater
attention should be paid to the damage that Peru's regulatory system
seems to be wreaking on its economic performance.
We recognize that it is difficult to quantify these effects. Much addi-
tional research of the kind the Institute is now undertaking will be needed
to estimate the increase in formal sector investment that would result if
informal entrepreneuers were given access to formal credit and rights of
property, contract, and business organization. Neither do we know how
much informal entrepreneurs would expand the scale of their operations if
they did not fear detection and punishment for operating without neces-
sary licenses. These quantification problems are compounded by the inter-
actions among the Peruvian economy's other anti-competitive features.
Limited property and contract right protection, for example, not only dis-
courages informal entrepreneurs from expanding their activities but also
denies them access to less expensive credit at formal lending institutions,
which further discourages expansion. Interest rate controls not only lead
to credit rationing in favor of formal entrepreneurs but also discourage
domestic savings and encourage capital flight, which harm both the infor-
mal and formal sectors. Because these effects are widespread in Peru, its
economic policy-makers cannot safely ignore them.
Our experience in Peru teaches a third lesson, namely that important
links exist among informal activity, economic growth, corruption, regula-
tory rationality and accountability, and the legal system. As Peru's experi-
ence demonstrates, the law's propensity to define and protect property
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rights, secure citizen access to the regulatory process, require analysis and
justification of rules, and encourage enterprise can hardly be taken for
granted. These virtues are highly contingent on ideological and institu-
tional commitments that Peru has been manifestly unwilling to make.
Unless Peru is prepared to alter the underlying rules of the game in this
direction, significant improvement in its long-term economic performance
is unlikely. In an integrated world economy increasingly characterized by
intense competition and convulsive change, Peru's form of mercantilism is
a self-destructive strategy.
A fourth lesson concerns the danger of what one might call "intellectual
imperialism." As students of past domestic and foreign policy reform ini-
tiatives, the authors were well-acquainted with the tendency of reformers
to underestimate the controversiality of their value assumptions and policy
goals and to neglect the cultural, institutional, and political obstacles to
implementation of their proposals. As visitors in an alien culture, we were
reasonably sensitive both to the distinctiveness of the American experience
and to our abject ignorance of Peruvian ways. The attempts at "Peruvi-
anization" were intended to help avoid the most serious risks of ethnocen-
tric distortion, but the shortness of time ensured that even these precau-
tions would not enable us to shed our premises wholly or to understand
theirs fully. In particular, our deeply-embedded assumptions about cul-
tural and institutional constraints on governmental power, so prominent
in American life and so weak in Peru, proved difficult to abandon. Our
frantic search for mechanisms to enforce the proposed reforms-courts,
media, public interest groups, individualistic ethos, ombudsmen, any-
thing-may have been resourceful, but in the Peruvian context was
largely irrelevant. In the end the best safeguard against this kind of politi-
cal hubris is a reformer like De Soto who has a sophisticated, realistic
conception of what his country is and what it might become.
Our final lesson is captured in Max Weber's description of politics as
"a strong and slow boring of hard boards." 8 Implementing fundamental
reforms in a Third World political economy like Peru's is an exceedingly
difficult, laborious process. At a minimum, such innovations must be
sponsored at the very highest levels of government to ensure that they are
placed prominently on the public agenda. In addition, new coalitions must
be mobilized, consisting of political entrepreneurs like De Soto, groups of
informals, reform-minded regulators, and formal sector firms with a stake
in strengthening competition. These coalitions must educate and influence
38. M. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 128 (H.
Gerth & C. Mills ed. 1958).
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the public and politicians and also exploit newly-created opportunities to
participate actively in the shaping of regulatory policy.
In some societies, especially those unlike our own in which the govern-
ment possesses effective centralized power, fundamental policy shifts of
this kind can sometimes be accomplished quickly if they are endorsed by
the small number of significant power holders. This political insight gov-
erned De Soto's initial strategy. But he did not fully appreciate until it
was too late that even with such elite endorsements, fundamental reforms
may flounder if they are pushed too fast, or only from the center. De
Soto's program has yet to attain the success that had been sought because
it was too ambitious, even with "Peruvianization," and too much in a
hurry, despite five years of hard work. His program stepped on too many
bureaucratic toes before De Soto had an opportunity to build a strong
popular constituency for change. In a sense, our effort was a classic exam-
ple of "top-down" reform: a program of policy innovation that concen-
trated on persuading the Council of Ministers rather than on generating
grass roots pressure and winning support at the lower levels of the
bureaucracy where policy is actually implemented. The experience of reg-
ulatory reform in Peru suggests that, although this approach may be a
perfectly natural and perhaps indispensable tactic, it is not sufficient.
De Soto and his colleagues appear to have learned this last lesson. The
Institute is now beginning to generate significant support within the infor-
mal sector for some of its reform proposals. But a long uphill struggle
remains in a society in which the mountainous mercantilist terrain may
simply be too steep for any lone innovator to conquer.
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